Insights into = Saudi Arabia, Theocracy, Terrorism | Mark Silverberg

America has=20 learned that the road to stabilizing the = Palestinian=20 territories, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and = virtually=20 the entire Middle East runs through Tehran.=20 Unfortunately, it has not yet learned = that a=20 defensive military strategy cannot stop an = aggressive=20 enemy committed to conquest - unless that enemy = believes=20 that its very existence is at=20 stake.

The=20 asymmetry of waging a defensive war against an=20 aggressive enemy surfaced during the Truman=20 administration in its confrontation with = Communist North=20 Korea. When the Chinese Communists drove the UN = forces=20 out of North Korea in their quest to conquer the = entire=20 peninsula, Truman (to the surprise of the = Chinese)=20 failed to threaten the overthrow of the North = Korean=20 Communist regime adopting instead a defensive = posture by=20 choosing to wage the war in the South. As a = result,=20 American forces quickly became bogged down in a = conflict=20 with no clear end in sight. (1)

In = 1961, the=20 Kennedy Administration institutionalized this = policy and=20 morphed it into the doctrine of = =E2=80=9Cflexible response.=E2=80=9D The=20 doctrine assumed that an enemy would more or = less=20 conduct war according to our rules of = engagement=20 and "get the message" if we gradually escalated = the=20 conflict in response to their aggression. While = it may=20 have worked on Khrushchev during the Cuban = missile=20 crisis of 1962, the doctrine proved to be = useless=20 against the Communist North Vietnamese who were=20 committed to the conquest of South Vietnam and = the=20 unification of the country under Communist rule. = Both=20 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson adopted what = amounted to=20 a defensive posture in South Vietnam to counter = the=20 Communist threat from the North. As a result, = five=20 hundred thousand American troops were confined = to South=20 Vietnam with no thought of bringing down the = Communist=20 government of North Vietnam. Because of that = strategy=20 (according to a 1995 Wall Street Journal=20 interview with Bui Tin, a former colonel on the = General=20 Staff of the North Vietnamese Army), North = Vietnamese=20 leaders felt confident enough even after their=20 tremendous losses during the Tet Offensive to = drag out=20 the war until America's will to fight was broken = by the=20 American anti-war movement.

This same=20 failed strategy has dogged American military war = strategy ever since. During the Iranian embassy = crisis,=20 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini told his = Revolutionary=20 Guards that they had nothing to fear from = America after=20 the Embassy take-over since President = Carter=E2=80=99s only=20 serious response to the hostage-taking was to = impose=20 ineffectual diplomatic and economic sanctions, = an=20 embargo on Iranian oil and a break in diplomatic = relations - none of which threatened = Khomeini=E2=80=99s regime.=20 More aggressive U.S. action including capturing = Iranian=20 oil fields or conducting targeted bombings in = Iran were=20 ruled out as too dangerous. "Our youth should be = confident that=20 America cannot do a damn thing," Khomeini told = his=20 followers three days after the embassy takeover. = =E2=80=9DAmerica is far too impotent to = interfere in a military=20 way here. If they could have interfered, they = would have=20 saved the Shah." What especially surprised = Khomeini was=20 that Carter and his aides, notably Secretary of = State=20 Cyrus Vance, rather than condemning the seizure = and the=20 treatment of the hostages as a barbaric act = appeared=20 apologetic for unspecified mistakes supposedly = committed=20 by the United States and asked for forgiveness = and=20 magnanimity. In the end, Khomeini ordered = the=20 U.S. flag to be painted at the entrance of = airports,=20 railway stations, ministries, factories, = schools, hotels=20 and bazaars so the faithful could trample it = under their=20 feet every day - the ultimate insult. One could = almost=20 discern the words of Adolf Hitler after his 1938 = meeting=20 with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain: = "Our=20 enemies are little worms," Hitler told his = General=20 Staff. "I saw them at Munich." America had lost = more=20 than its prestige in the eyes of Ayatollah = Khomeini; it=20 had lost its credibility.

And=20 President Clinton fared no better. His defensive = approach to foreign aggression continued even as = Americans were being harvested by Islamic = terrorists=20 from New York to Saudi Arabia to Kenya to the = USS Cole=20 in Aden Harbor. He sent cruise missiles to blow = up empty=20 tents in the Afghan desert and pharmaceutical = factories=20 in the Sudan, passed on =E2=80=9Ctaking = out=E2=80=9D bin Laden, signed=20 agreements with dictators based on the = assumption that=20 America would somehow be "safer", hamstrung = American=20 intelligence services in the name of civil = liberties,=20 shrunk the American military in the name of = economy, and=20 chose to use the courts as the battleground, = rather than=20 engaging with the terrorists and taking the war = to them=20 and their sponsors. This led bin Laden to = believe that=20 he was dealing with an American "paper tiger" - = a=20 country that relied on rhetoric and dialogue, = but never=20 aggressive military action to secure its = strategic=20 interests abroad =E2=80=93 the same mentality = that has now led=20 the Saudis, the Egyptians and Arab Emirates to = mend=20 fences with Iran=E2=80=99s Ahmedinejad whom they = hate=20 passionately, but whom they perceive to be the = =E2=80=9Cstrong=20 horse=E2=80=9D in the Middle East today.

If any of = this=20 sounds uncomfortably familiar, it should, = because this=20 same failed military strategy is now playing = itself out=20 in Iraq. Senior American officials report that=20 approximately 75%-80% of=20 foreign terrorists in Iraq are of Saudi, Libyan, = Syrian,=20 Algerian, Yemenite and Sudanese origin and have = been=20 provided with sophisticated weaponry and other=20 logistical support by Iranian Revolutionary = Guard units=20 and an estimated 30,000 Iranian agents operating = within=20 Iraq. A Defense Department report released on = December=20 19, 2007 emphasized that support for terrorist = groups by=20 Tehran's Shiite government remains "a = significant=20 impediment to progress." No=20 kidding.

So=20 the question arises: =E2=80=9CHow can America = possibly=20 stabilize, reconstruct or democratize Iraq, when = Iran=20 and its terrorist proxies are totally committed = to=20 humiliating us, breaking our spirit, destroying = our=20 efforts and ultimately driving us from the = region?=E2=80=9D=20 During World War II, it would have been = unthinkable for=20 the = Allies to=20 have stopped at the German border and begun=20 reconstruction efforts in liberated France in = 1944=20 before destroying the Third Reich and=20 de-Nazifying Germany. Similarly, the = stabilization and=20 reconstruction of Iraq can only be accomplished=20 after we have brought down the mullahs = and=20 de-Islamified Iran. If the American = people have=20 grown weary of the war in Iraq, it is because = the=20 average American is tired of waging futile wars=20 predicated on a failed military strategy. = Americans want=20 victory, not excuses and a military = strategy based=20 on a defensive posture can never = defeat an=20 enemy determined to wage a war of conquest. =

Today,=20 we hear rumblings of secret State Department=20 negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. = What we=20 fail to understand is that, in the Middle East,=20 negotiations are simply a way to buy time. = That's Iran's=20 goal. For the U.S. to press for negotiations is = seen as=20 a sign of weakness, fear and defeatism. As such, = negotiations with the mullahs at this late date = will=20 only serve to reinforce the power and influence = of the=20 Tehran regime and allow it to move on the fast = track to=20 uranium enrichment. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali = Khamenei=20 and his President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (and even = our=20 erstwhile Arab "friends") believe that American = resolve=20 is faltering, that we have lost the will to = retaliate,=20 that we are divided, frightened and indecisive, = and=20 that's why our flawed military strategy in the = region is=20 only facilitating the perception of American = weakness.=20 By removing the threat of military intervention = and=20 regime change, we have not only guaranteed a = nuclear=20 Iran, but our defeat in Iraq. The Iranians know = it. The=20 Arabs know it. And I suspect even the Israelis = know it.=20 We = have sent=20 a message to our friends and our enemies that we = consider bringing down the mullahs and ending = the=20 Islamic revolution in Iran too costly to pursue = even=20 though we have exhausted all the alternatives. = In so=20 doing, we have conveyed the perception that = although=20 America possesses a vast technological advantage = and=20 great military power, it lacks the political = will to use=20 them against Iran.

As = former=20 Attorney-General John Ashcroft wrote in the = final=20 chapter of his recent book Never Again = with=20 reference to the events of 9/11: "I remember the = cost of=20 weakness. Misguided decisions always have = consequences.=20 In this war....a moral imperative for toughness = exists.=20 What will separate us from the mistakes of the = past is=20 our will to win" Like it or not, the = responsibility for=20 regime change and de-Islamifying Iran rests = primarily=20 with America and the many dissident Iranian = groups=20 seeking an end to the Islamic revolution and a = return to=20 stability, international acceptance and economic = prosperity. If Iran is to go nuclear, we had = best insure=20 that a friendly government rules in Tehran. If = not, no=20 nation that ever opposes the mullahs=E2=80=99 = global Islamic=20 ambitions will be secure once their nuclear = shield is in=20 place.

ENDNOTES

When=20 Eisenhower became President, he recognized = that the=20 North Koreans were committed to the conquest = of the=20 South. He therefore communicated to the North = Koreans=20 his intention to escalate the war by using = nuclear=20 weapons if they persisted in their aggression = =E2=80=93 and he=20 meant it =E2=80=93 and they knew = it. Eisenhower was=20 convinced that a defensive war was useless = against an=20 ideological adversary committed to the = conquest of=20 South Korea. From his perspective and based on = his=20 experiences in World War II, he understood = that the=20 challenge of the North Korean Communists had = to be met=20 just as America had met the challenge of an=20 expansionist Nazi Germany bent on conquest. = Eisenhower=20 believed that the only response to total war=20 was total war.